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 1.  THE BIRTH OF THE CYPRIOT CONSTITUTIONAL 
LEGAL ORDER 
 Th e Republic of Cyprus is a relatively  “ young ” Republic, since the small island 
only gained the status of an independent and sovereign state in 1960 aft er the 
Zurich and London Agreements. Th e Agreements, reached between Greece and 
Turkey, provided a plan for the establishment of an independent state. Th ey 
comprised three treaties on the basis of which the Constitution of the newly 
created state was draft ed. Th e three treaties were the Treaty of Guarantee, 1 the 
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Treaty of Alliance 2 and the Treaty of Establishment, 3 which collectively provided, 
 inter alia , for Greece, Turkey and the UK to guarantee the independence, 
territorial integrity and security of the Republic, the establishment of Greek 
and Turkish military contingents in Cyprus, and the preservation of two British 
sovereign base areas in Cyprus. 4 
 Th e Treaty of Establishment is incorporated into the 1960 Cyprus 
Constitution . Th e Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance, which are 
annexed to the Constitution (Annexes I and II respectively), have been given 
constitutional force by virtue of Art. 181 of the Constitution. Th e Cyprus 
Constitution was described  “ as the centrepiece of an intricate network of 
international agreements and undertakings, delicately but inextricably 
interwoven with one another and with the Constitution itself  ” . 5 Papasavvas 
gives fi ve attributes to the 1960 Constitution, namely  “ imposed, rigid, complex, 
anti-democratic and dividing ” . 6 Following the withdrawal of the Turkish 
Cypriots from the institutions of the Republic shortly aft er its birth in 1964, 
the Cypriot government has continued acting on the basis of the  “ law of 
necessity ” . 7 It is within this framework that the Republic of Cyprus is an actor in 
international law. 8 
 2  Treaty of Alliance between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey of 16 August 1960. 
 3  Treaty of Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus between the UK, Greece, Turkey and 
Cyprus of 16 August 1960. 
 4  For a comprehensive analysis of the constitutional history of Cyprus, including since 
independence see e.g.  A.  Emilianides ,  Cyprus Constitutional Law ( Wolters Kluwer ,  2013 ), 
 pp. 13 – 21 . For an in-depth legal analysis of the Cypriot legal order in an EU context, see  S. 
 Laulh é Shaelou ,  Th e EU and Cyprus: Principles and Strategies of Full Integration ( SEUR vol. 
 3 ,  Martinus Nijhoff  ,  2010 ) ; see also  C.  Kombos ,  Th e Impact of EU Law on Cypriot Public Law 
( Sakkoulas ,  2015 ) . For a review of the constitutional structure of Cyprus, see  C.  Kombos and 
 S.  Laulh é Shaelou ,  “ Th e Cypriot Constitution under the impact of EU law :  An asymmetrical 
formation ” in  A.  Albi (ed.),  National Constitutions in European and Global Governance: 
Democracy, Rights and the Rule of Law ( TMC Asser Press ,  2017 ) . For a detailed legal analysis 
of the SBAs in Cyprus, see  S.  Laulh é Shaelou ,  “ Th e principle of territorial exclusion in the 
EU: SBAs in Cyprus  – a special case of sui generis territories in the EU ” , in  D.  Kochenov (ed.), 
 EU Law of the Overseas:  Outermost Regions, Associated Overseas Countries and Territories, 
Territories Sui Generis ( Kluwer Law International ,  2011 ) . 
 5  S.A.  De Smith ,  Th e New Commonwealth and its Constitutions ( Stevens ,  1964 ),  p. 285 . 
 6  S.S.  Papasavvas ,  La Justice Constitutionnelle  à Chypre ( Economica ,  1998 ),  p. 258 , (translated 
by the authors). 
 7  In constitutional law,  “ necessity ” justifi es acts done or proceedings taken under legislation 
passed in violation of a constitutional provision due to the occurrence of  “ necessitous ” 
circumstances. Th e doctrine of necessity justifi es the enforcement of an otherwise invalid and 
unlawful law. See e.g.  C.  Kombos ,  Th e Doctrine of Necessity in Constitutional Law ( Sakkoulas , 
 2015 ) . 
 8  S.  Laulh é Shaelou ,  “ ‘ Back to reality ’ : the implications of EU membership in the constitutional 
legal order of Cyprus ” in  A.  Lazowski (ed.)  Brave New World: Application of EU Law in the 
New Member States ( TMC Asser Press , 2010),  pp. 471 – 84 . 
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Cyprus
 2.  NATIONAL COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL RULES 
ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 
 Cyprus is a hybrid system stemming both from civil law and common law 
traditions 9 and arguably drawing both from monism and dualism. 10 Treaties, 
conventions and international agreements need to be ratifi ed by the relevant 
authorities of the Republic in accordance with Art. 169 of the Constitution, 
the latter remaining the supreme law of the Republic under Art. 179(1) of 
the Constitution. 11 Th e ratifi cation of treaties in Cyprus, 12 and the transfer of 
powers to international organisations (IOs), need to be considered within the 
framework of the status of the Republic of Cyprus in public international law 
and, as already mentioned, the rigid nature of its Constitution, which infl uence 
Cyprus ’ s membership in IOs. 13 Th e relationship the Republic maintains with IOs 
must also be examined in the light of the  de facto division of its territory and 
in view of the several attempts (including those currently on-going) to fi nd a 
solution to the Cyprus problem. 14 
 Th e Council of Ministers has the power to conclude any international 
agreement by virtue of Arts. 50 and 54 of the Constitution. Th ere is a diff erence 
between international agreements concluded with a foreign state or an IO falling 
under the scope of Art. 169(1) of the Constitution and relating to  “ commercial 
matters, economic co-operation and  motus vivendi ” , which are merely concluded 
under a decision of the Council of Ministers, and any other international 
agreement falling under Art. 169(2) of the Constitution, which requires them 
to be  “ negotiated and signed under a decision of the Council of Ministers ” but 
will  “ only be operative and binding on the Republic when approved by a law 
 9  See  N.  Hatzimihail ,  “ Cyprus as a mixed legal system ” ( 2013 )  6 ( 1 )  Journal of Civil Law 
Studies  37 . 
 10  For a legal analysis from a monist perspective, see S. Laulh é Shaelou (n. 8), p. 474. For a legal 
analysis from a dualist perspective, see Emilianides (n. 4). 
 11  Cyprus Constitution available in the English language at  < http://www.presidency.gov.
cy/presidency/presidency.nsf/all/1003AEDD83EED9C7C225756F0023C6AD/$file/CY_
Constitution.pdf > . 
 12  For a legal analysis of the reception of international legal agreements in the Cypriot national 
legal order, see Laulh é Shaelou,  Th e EU and Cyprus (n. 4) 130 – 40. 
 13  It should be noted that almost from the date of its creation up to its accession to the EU 
(1961 – 2004), the Republic of Cyprus was a member of the non-aligned movement. Cyprus is 
also the only EU Member State who is not a member of NATO or of the Partnership for Peace 
Programme. 
 14  For a detailed review of the implications of the  de facto division of the territory of the 
Republic of Cyprus on the application of EU law in Cyprus, see Laulh é Shaelou,  Th e EU and 
Cyprus (n. 4). 
Intersentia
Stéphanie Laulhé Shaelou and Katerina Kalaitzaki
498
made by the House of Representatives whereupon it shall be concluded ” . In 
accordance with Art. 169(3) of the Constitution, all such agreements have, 
 “ as from their publication in the offi  cial Gazette of the Republic, superior force to 
any municipal law on condition that such treaties, conventions and agreements 
are applied by the other party thereto ” . Th is Article of the Constitution, combined 
with Art.  179, appears to constitute the formal framework of hierarchical 
incorporation of international law into the Cypriot constitutional legal 
order. 
 In this respect, Emilianides argues that the Constitution has adopted a 
strictly dualist approach in regards to the relationship between national and 
international law, stating that: 
 It is only through publication in the Offi  cial Gazette that the international law 
instrument may be invoked before the Cypriot courts and applied in the Cypriot 
legal order. Th e international law instrument has superior force over any ordinary 
domestic legislation, not in the sense of repealing any inconsistent domestic law, but 
in the sense of having superiority and precedence in its application. International law, 
once incorporated in the national legal order and published in the Offi  cial Gazette, 
is superior to any other municipal law, irrespective of whether such law is prior or 
subsequent to the international law instrument; an international law instrument may 
obviously not be impliedly repealed through the enactment of confl icting subsequent 
municipal legislation. 15 
 Moreover, in the hierarchy of norms, the international law instruments are 
placed above any other municipal legislation, provided that they also comply 
with the condition of reciprocity laid down by Art. 169(3). Th e Supreme Court 
has ruled, however, that due to the nature of certain international treaties and 
conventions (i.e. multilateral), the condition of reciprocity does not always 
apply. 16 International law instruments do not prevail over the Constitution, as 
the supreme law of the Republic does not fall within the defi nition of municipal 
law under Art. 169(3) of the Constitution. 
 It lies beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss the precise monist/
dualist views adopted in Cyprus with respect to the relationship between 
national and international law (as it could be argued that there is a substantial 
diff erence between international agreements concluded under Art. 169(1) and 
(2), which appears to trigger a diff erent approach to the incorporation of the 
given international agreement into national law). It would therefore be just to 
argue that the relationship is predominantly dualist and partly monist, since 
Art. 169(1) only covers international treaties concerning  “ commercial matters, 
economic co-operation and  modus vivendi ” , while Art. 169(2) covers all the 
other matters stemming from international treaties. It remains, however, that 
 15  Emilianides (n. 4), pp. 33 – 34. 
 16  Malachtou v .  Armeft i and Another [ 1987 ]  1 CLR 207 . 
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respective arguments pointing towards a strictly/predominantly dualist/monist 
tradition in Cyprus have repercussions on the perception of the principle 
of supremacy of European Union (EU) law as an (autonomous) source of 
international law, and consequently on the extent of the duty of harmonious 
interpretation under EU law, both implicitly underlying the jurisprudence in 
Cyprus and lying at the core of this chapter. In particular, arguing along strict 
dualist lines can lead to the conclusion that EU law forms an integral part of and 
is subject in all instances to the constitutional framework through the triggering 
of Arts. 169 and 179 of the Constitution. 17 Th is view on the relationship between 
EU law and national law, to which the present authors do not entirely subscribe, 
does not seem be supported by other scholars in Cyprus either. 18 
 Th e above-mentioned provisions of the constitutional framework of the 
Republic of Cyprus were already at the centre of legal debates prior to Cyprus 
joining the EU in 2004. 19 It was recognised fairly early on by the Cypriot courts, 
before EU accession, that Community law, based on international treaties, forms 
 “ a distinct legal system which is capable of creating directly eff ective rights 
for those subject to it ” , which must be regarded as  “ independent of national 
laws ” and  “ superior to them ” . 20 To this end, and in preparation for Cyprus ’ s 
EU accession, there were voices recommending amending the Constitution to 
 “ make space ” for EU law supremacy, 21 pointing to the procedure to amend non-
basic constitutional provisions such as Arts. 169 and 179, under Art. 182 of the 
Constitution, 22 despite the division of the island and through the application of 
 17  Emilianides (n. 4), p. 34 and 37, where he classifi es EU (and EC) law as an  “ intra-constitutional 
eff ect ” and that it is the  “ Constitution itself which provides for the facilitation of [EU] law 
within the Cypriot legal order and its specifi c primacy ” . 
 18  C.  Kombos and  A.  Pantazi Lambrou ,  “ Cyprus ” in  J.  Laff ranque (ed.),  Th e Protection of 
Fundamental Rights Post-Lisbon ( Reports of the XXV FIDE Congress Tallinn  2012 , vol.   1 , 
 Tartu University Press , 2012),  pp. 303 – 54, 309 :  “ the hierarchical rule resulting from Art. 179 
does not apply to EU law ” ; see also  C.  Lycourgos ,  ‘ Cyprus public law as aff ected by accession 
to the EU ’ in  C.  Kombos (ed.),  Studies in European Public Law ( Sakkoulas ,  2010 ),  p. 101 . For 
a detailed analysis, see also Laulh é Shaelou (n. 8). 
 19  See Kombos and Laulh é Shaelou (n. 4). 
 20  Eracleous v. Municipality of Limassol ,  No 5793, judgment of the Supreme Court , 
 14 December 1993 (translated by the authors); see  N.  Emiliou in  TMC  Asser Instituut ,  Th e 
Impact of EU Accession on the Legal Orders of New EU Member States and (Pre-)candidate 
Countries: Hopes and Fears ( TMCA Press ,  2006 ),  p. 305 ; see also  F.  Hoff meister ,  Legal Aspects 
of the Cyprus Problem. Annan Plan and EU Accession ( Martinus Nijhoff  Publishers ,  2006 ), 
 p. 205 . 
 21  Th e example of the Irish Constitution, whereby the principle of Community law supremacy 
is incorporated into the Constitution, was brought forward in  G.  Bermann  et al ., 
 ‘ Opinion: Implications of membership in the EU for a constitutional settlement in Cyprus ’ 
 of 29 March 2001 in  A.  Markides (ed.),  Cyprus and EU Membership: Important Legal 
Documents ( PIO ,  2002 ) para. 44 and was said to provide a good precedent for Cyprus, see 
Emiliou (n. 20), p. 306. 
 22  Under Art. 182, basic Articles of the Constitution cannot be amended, while a two third 
majority of both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot votes at the House of Representatives is 
necessary to amend the rest. 
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the law of necessity. 23 Th e express reference to European Community (EC) law 
supremacy should have been decided by the House of Representatives on the basis 
of Art. 182(2) – (3) of the Constitution, but the Attorney General ’ s offi  ce issued 
an opinion confi rming that no amendment to the Constitution was necessary 
prior to ratifi cation of the Treaty of Accession. Th e House of Representatives 
therefore ratifi ed the Treaty on the basis of Art. 169 of the Constitution, 24 just 
like any other international treaty, with the  “ hope ” that if and when subject 
to judicial review, 25 a situation of  “ tacit acceptance ” of the supremacy of 
Community law, or at least, of  “ non-confl ict between the two sets of legal norms ” , 
would arise. 26 In other words, it was  “ hoped that the courts would enable the 
eff ective and effi  cient participation of the Republic in the EU by harmoniously 
construing the obligations arising from EU membership with national 
constitutional law ” . 27 
 Instead, the Supreme Court of Cyprus sent the matter back to the legislature 
by upholding the supremacy of the Cypriot Constitution on the fi rst occasion 
provided by the challenge of the constitutionality of the European arrest 
warrant under Cypriot law, 28 pointing to the need for a formal constitutional 
amendment. 29 Th e measure challenged in this case concerned obligations 
imposed upon Member States to comply with a Framework Decision in criminal 
justice based on the old Th ird Pillar (the surrender of one of its nationals to 
another Member State in response to a European arrest warrant). 30 Th ere 
were already clear signals at the time that the interpretation of Community 
law applicable during the judicial review process at national level should also 
apply to measures falling under the Th ird Pillar, including the competence of 
 23  See A. Markides,  “ Th e constitutional impact of Cyprus ’ accession to the EU ” (speech, 
21 May 2001, Nicosia), p. 6 (on fi le with the authors); see also Emiliou (n. 20), p. 307;  Contra 
K. Chrysostomides,  “ Issues under constitutional and international law in the path of Cyprus 
towards accession to the EU ” (speech, 29 – 30 June 2001, Nicosia) 5 as quoted in Hoff meister 
(n. 20), pp. 205 and 150. 
 24  Ratifying law No 35(III)/2003,  Offi  cial Gazette No 3740, 25.07.2003. 
 25  Th e Cypriot courts clarifi ed through their case-law that an international treaty, being 
inferior to the Constitution, is subject to judicial review to the extent that the constitutional 
provisions prevail in case of confl ict and within the framework of Arts. 169(3) and 179(1) of 
the Constitution. 
 26  Laulh é Shaelou (n. 8), p. 475. 
 27  Kombos and Laulh é Shaelou (n. 4), sections 1.2.1–1.2.4. 
 28  Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant 
and the surrender procedures between Member States [ 2002 ]  OJ L190/1 . 
 29  Attorney General of the Republic of Cyprus v. Costas Constantinou [ 2005 ]  1 CLR 1356 , [2007] 
3 CMLR 42; see case note by A. Tsadiras (2007) 44 CML Rev 1515. In the present case, the 
Attorney General of the Republic had requested the delivery of Mr Constantinou to the UK 
authorities on the basis of a European Arrest Warrant issued against him. 
 30  For a recent and comprehensive legal analysis of the case, see Kombos and Laulh é Shaelou 
(n. 4). 
Intersentia 501
Cyprus
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to hear such references by virtue of (old) 
Art. 35 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). 31 Nevertheless, Cyprus had not 
at the time submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court regarding acts of the EU 
institutions in the area of police cooperation in criminal matters. Any attempt 
at judicial dialogue between the Supreme Court of Cyprus and the ECJ was 
therefore prevented, on formal grounds at least, to the detriment of the uniform 
interpretation of EU law (as it stood at the time). 32 
 Instead, the main legal issue was dealt with by the Supreme Court within 
the ambit of the constitutional legal order, despite acknowledging the case-
law of the ECJ on the supremacy of EU law and irrespective of the pleas 
made by the Attorney General to grant the EU law instrument superior force 
to the Constitution. 33 Th e Cypriot House of Representatives, like in other 
Member States, had to enact a law adopting the Framework Decision, 34 which 
was subject to judicial review. Based on a narrow understanding of judicial 
dialogue and of the duty of harmonious interpretation (which remained subject 
to the national court being able to interpret national law in accordance with 
Framework Decisions), any dispute before the national courts arising from the 
transposing law was found by the Supreme Court to be unconstitutional, since 
at that time Art. 11 of the Constitution did not provide for the extradition of 
Cypriot nationals with a view to the execution of a European Arrest Warrant. 35 
Th e Supreme Court concluded that no provision in the law promulgated by the 
House of Representatives could be interpreted  “ in such a way so as to prevail and 
to be applied as regards the nationals of the Republic ” . 36 
 31  “ [J]urisdiction [under Art 35 EU] would be deprived of most of its useful eff ect if 
individuals were not entitled to invoke framework decisions in order to obtain a conforming 
interpretation of national law before the courts of the member states ” ,  Case C-105/03 ,  Pupino , 
 ECLI:EU:C:2005:386 , para. 38. 
 32  Laulh é Shaelou (n. 8), pp. 476 – 78. 
 33  See para. 21,  Constantinou , which reads as follows:  “ Th us, the main issue concerning the 
present case that remains to be discussed is the submission put forward by the [AG], namely 
that the Act which incorporated the [EAW] into the legal system of our country ranks higher 
than the Constitution and, consequently, it must be applied ” (translation from Westlaw UK); 
see Tsadiras ’ review of the Supreme Court ’ s ruling (2007) 44 CML Rev 1515, 1524 – 26. 
 34  Law 133(1)/2004,  Offi  cial Gazette No 3850, 30.04.2004. 
 35  See Laulh é Shaelou (n. 8), p. 476. For a review of similar decisions of constitutional courts 
in other Member States at the time, see other contributions in Lazowksi (n. 8). Th e review of 
this case-law illustrated a certain degree of reluctance at the time, including among some new 
Member States, to accept the supremacy of EC/EU law unconditionally, in particular when 
fundamental rights of a national nature and/or with a particular meaning in the national 
system were involved. Nevertheless, the legality of the European Arrest Warrant under EU 
law was confi rmed by the ECJ, rejecting any idea of violation of human rights and of abuse 
of powers under (old) Art. 34 TEU (see  Case C-303/05 ,  Advocatenvoor de Wereld VZW , 
 ECLI:EU:C:2007:261 ). 
 36  Para. 24,  Constantinou . 
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 Th is decision of the Supreme Court forced a formal legislative (re)action in 
Cyprus which had been deferred so far and led to the creation of positive law. 
Amendments to the Cyprus Constitution were fi nally tabled before and passed 
by the House of Representatives with the clear objective to remove the potential 
confl ict between EC/EU law and the Constitution. 37 Art. 1A was therefore 
added, to the eff ect that the supremacy of EU law over the Constitution is  prima 
facie established, providing that: 
 [n]o provision of the Constitution shall be deemed to annul laws enacted, acts done or 
measures taken by the Republic which become necessary by reason of its obligations 
as a member state of the European Union, nor does it prevent Regulations, Directives 
or other acts or binding measures of a legislative character, adopted by the European 
Union or the European Communities or by their institutions or competent bodies 
thereof on the basis of the Treaties establishing the European Communities or the 
Treaty on European Union, from having legal eff ect in the Republic. 38 
 In addition to Art. 11 of the Constitution, which needed to be amended and 
supplemented for the purpose of the European Arrest Warrant, 39 Arts. 140, 40 
169, 41 and 179 42 of the Constitution were also amended and/or supplemented in 
order to give  a priori full eff ect to the new Art. 1A of the Constitution. Th e precise 
impact of Art. 1A nevertheless remained unclear. In particular, while Art. 179(1) 
was made subject to Art. 1A, it still provided that the Constitution  “ remains 
the supreme law of the Republic ” . 43 No direct reference to the supremacy of 
EC/EU law was made in the amendments, thereby avoiding addressing the very 
diffi  cult question at the time of what legal order prevails over the Constitution, 
i.e. EC law or EU law. It was contended at the time that it should have been 
EU law. Cyprus (like Lithuania) would then have been considered at the forefront 
 37  Fift h Amendment to the Constitution Law 127(I)/2006, Offi  cial Gazette No 4090, 28.07.2006 
available at  < http://www.olc.gov.cy/olc/olc.nsf/all/EC240D2A9413ABBB4225793A0040348
4/$fi le/Th e%20Fift h%20Amendment%20of%20the%20Constitution%20Law%20of%202006.
pdf?openelement > . 
 38  Translated by the authors. 
 39  Art. 11(2)(f) was replaced with a new subpara. (f). For a comprehensive and up-to-date 
review of the various constitutional amendments made in the context of the European Arrest 
Warrant, see Kombos and Laulh é Shaelou (n. 4). 
 40  For a comprehensive and up-to-date legal analysis of the amendments to Art. 140 of 
the Constitution and their constitutional importance, see Kombos and Laulh é Shaelou 
(n 4). 
 41  A new para. (4) was inserted, to the eff ect that the Republic of Cyprus commits to act upon 
all the provisions deriving from EC and EU law, including when they amend national law. 
 42  Express reference to Art. 1A was made in para. (1); para. (2) now refers to the obligations 
imposed on the Republic arising out of EU membership. 
 43  It is clear, however, from Art. 4 of Law 35(III)/2003 that the rights and obligations of the 
Republic arising out of the Treaty of Accession prevail against contrary national rules and 
regulations. 
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of European integration by recognising such supremacy even before the ECJ. 
Should it have been merely EC law, then the confl ict between the European arrest 
warrant and the relevant provisions of the Constitution would have remained. 44 
Th e option was taken at the time to deal with the supremacy issue in a rather 
indirect or reverse way, by providing that no provision of the Constitution could 
be an obstacle to Cyprus complying with its obligations as a Member State of 
the EU. Th us, without expressly providing so, Art. 1A set out the principle of 
supremacy of EC and EU law, 45 in advance of the forthcoming  “ depillarisation ” 
of the Union construct, 46 by treating the Community and intergovernmental 
spheres  “ uniformly ” . 47 Th e broad scope of Art. 1A appeared justifi ed (or not) 
also for reasons related to the diffi  culties associated with amending the Cyprus 
Constitution and in view of the doctrine of necessity. 48 
 Th e legislative objective of removing the potential confl ict between 
EC/EU law and the Constitution appeared to have been achieved. However, the 
relationship between EU law and national law is subject to continuous judicial 
scrutiny. With respect to this aspect, the somewhat burdensome legacy of the 
 Constantinou ruling cannot be ignored. In the light of Art. 19(1) TEU and the 
case-law of the ECJ on the eff ectiveness of EU law, Cypriot courts, guided by 
the duty of harmonious interpretation, should normally evaluate on the merits of 
each case whether national law, including the Constitution as amended, provides 
an eff ective remedy, thus allowing for the full and correct implementation, 
application and enforcement of EU law and rights deriving there from in 
Cyprus. It appears that in Cyprus, however, the Supreme Court  – through its 
decision in  Constantinou  – has placed EU law supremacy under the authority 
of the national legal order, as opposed to deriving it from the inherent nature of 
EU law as promoted by the Court of Justice. Following the 2005 constitutional 
amendments, the Cypriot legal order had nevertheless appeared potentially 
well-equipped to receive and accommodate the principle of the supremacy of 
EU law to its fullest extent. Ten years onwards, however, the nature or the 
validity of Art. 1A of the Constitution remains untested before the Supreme 
Court, which continues to focus on the national legal order and national 
principles equivalent to EU law principles, in a (rather broad and fl uctuating) 
comparative perspective. A brief review of the court structure and legal tradition 
in Cyprus would assist in encapsulating court practice in Cyprus with respect to 
the principle of harmonious interpretation and appreciating the methodology of 
the present contribution. 
 44  Laulh é Shaelou (n. 8), p. 479. 
 45  C. Lycourgos,  “ Cyprus public law as aff ected by accession to the EU ” in C. Kombos (ed.), 
 Studies in European Public Law (Sakkoulas, 2010), p. 105. 
 46  Burgorgue-Larsen describes Art. 1A as a  “ v é ritable profession de foi juridique europ é enne ” 
in  ‘ Jurisprudence europ é enne compar é e ’ [2006] 4  Revue du Droit Public 1099, 1121. 
 47  See Tsadiras (2007) 44 CML Rev 1515, 1527. 
 48  On these last two points, see Kombos and Laulh é Shaelou (n. 4), section 1.2. 
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 3.  COURT STRUCTURE AND LEGAL TRADITION 
IN CYPRUS 
 3.1.  THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS 
AND THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 
 Another important characteristic of the Constitution is the principle of 
separation of powers as developed mainly in the case-law of the Supreme 
Court. Th e Constitution itself does not expressly set out such a principle, but its 
provisions clearly point to the separation of powers as the basic principle of the 
polity. Namely, Arts. 46 – 49 and 54 vest the executive power in the President of 
the Republic or the Council of Ministers; Art. 61 vests the legislative power in 
the House of Representatives; and Arts. 133 – 164 vest the judicial power in the 
Supreme Court (formerly Supreme Constitutional Court and High Court) and 
its subordinate courts. 
 Th e principle thus inherently set out by the Constitution, although appearing 
relatively strict, is not an absolute one. As such, the Council of Ministers 
may undertake preparatory legislative acts by draft ing bills before they are 
introduced to the House of Representatives, 49 while the Minister of Finance 
can submit the budget. 50 Moreover, ministers are granted the right to make 
statements to, and to follow, the proceedings of the House of Representatives, 51 
and the Council of Ministers is also vested with executive powers to issue 
subsidiary legislation 52 in certain circumstances. 53 Th e principle is deemed to 
have constitutional status: the Supreme Court has persistently ruled that if a 
law is contrary or inconsistent with the principle of separation of powers, it 
is rendered unconstitutional. 54 Th e full independence of the judiciary must 
also be emphasised. Finally, the principle of the separation of powers must also 
be interpreted in the light of the doctrine of necessity. 55 
 Originally, the Supreme Court has exercised the fi rst instance jurisdiction 
as a Supreme Constitutional Court. Pursuant to Art. 144 of the Constitution, 
the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to decide on the constitutionality 
of any law of the Republic and to resolve any power struggle between the 
Executive and the Legislature. Th erefore, whenever such a question was raised 
 49  Art. 54(f) of the Constitution of Cyprus. 
 50  Art. 167 of the Constitution of Cyprus. 
 51  Art. 79(2) of the Constitution of Cyprus. 
 52  More specifi cally the Council of Ministers is granted the power to issue administrative 
regulations or orders in the form of secondary legislation. 
 53  Art. 54(g) of the Constitution of Cyprus. 
 54  See  S.  Laulh é Shaelou and  K.  Kalaitzaki ,  “ Cyprus ” in  L.  Burgorgue-Larsen (ed.) ,  Th e EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights seized by the national judges/La Charte des Droits Fondamentaux de 
l ’ Union Europ é enne saisie par les judges en Europe ( Pedone ,  2016 ) ; see also Emilianides (n. 4), 
pp. 55 – 57 for a detailed account of the principle. 
 55  For a detailed account, see Emilianides (n. 4), pp. 22 – 24. 
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before any court, the latter should have reserved the question for the decision 
of the Supreme Court and stayed further proceedings until its determination. 
However, the events of 1964 in Cyprus resulted in the introduction of 
Law 33/64 on the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions), 
adopted by the House of Representatives in the absence of Turkish Cypriot 
members of Parliament, which created a new Supreme Court and merged the 
jurisdictions of the constitutionally provided Supreme Constitutional Court and 
the High Court. 56 As a result, Art. 144 was no longer applicable. Since 1964, 
any court in the Republic therefore has jurisdiction to hear questions on the 
constitutionality of laws without having to resort to the procedure provided for 
in Art. 144 of the Constitution, or having to refer the question to the Supreme 
(Constitutional) Court. 57 Th e Supreme Court only has exclusive jurisdiction 
in relation to the constitutionality of family law matters and also to decide 
on the constitutionality of laws in connection with which the President of the 
Republic exercises the right for referral granted to him under the Constitution. 58 
 Within the above framework, the Supreme Court exercises its powers in 
three diff erent jurisdictions. First, the Supreme Court exercises the second 
instance jurisdiction as a Court of Appeal. Namely, the Supreme Court hears 
all appeals on decisions of fi rst instance courts, which exercise jurisdiction 
in civil and criminal matters. As a rule, appeals are heard by three judges. 
When exercising its appellate jurisdiction the Supreme Court may confi rm, 
diff erentiate or set aside the contested decision or order the retrial of the case. 59 
Second, the Supreme Court exercises the revisional jurisdiction (judicial review) 
under Art. 146 of the Constitution, over which it, until recently, had exclusive 
jurisdiction, namely to hear applications in relation to the review of the legality 
of acts, decisions and omissions of any body, authority or person exercising 
executive or administrative authority. 60 
 A new amendment to the Constitution was introduced in July 2015, 61 which 
changed the structure of the Supreme Court by establishing Administrative 
Courts in Cyprus, allegedly in order to help the Supreme Court to alleviate its 
workload. Th e amendments transferred the fi rst instance jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court under Art. 146 of the Constitution exclusively to the newly 
established Administrative Court. Th e Administrative Court started operations 
in January 2016, and even if the impact of its case-law on the court structure 
in Cyprus remains to be seen, a few points should be made for the purpose of 
the present discussion. Th e Cypriot legislator not only removed the exclusive 
 56  Kombos and Pantazi Lambrou,  “ Cyprus ” (n. 18), p. 308. 
 57  For a detailed account, see Emilianides (n. 4), pp. 39 – 44. 
 58  See generally Emilianides (n. 4), pp. 119 – 21. 
 59  < http://www.supremecourt.gov.cy/judicial/sc.nsf/DMLSCourt_gr/DMLSCourt_gr?Open
Document > . 
 60  See generally Emilianides (n. 4), pp. 197 – 98. 
 61  Eighth Amendment of the Constitution 2015 (130(I)/2015). 
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competence of the Supreme Court in cases of administrative law at fi rst 
instance, but also made the Supreme Court a Court of Appeal only on legal 
grounds. 62 Th e formation and operation of the new Court is therefore bound 
to entail signifi cant changes in the award of administrative justice in Cyprus, 
which, according to the Constitution, was defi ned as an exclusive competence 
of the Supreme Constitutional Court. Th e Administrative Court will also 
be involved in the internalisation of EU law in Cyprus. Instead of a solution 
deriving from the separation of the Supreme Court into two courts as provided 
by the Constitution itself, the adoption of an amending law creating the new 
Administrative Court was preferred. Th is will in turn also potentially impact on 
the legal reasoning of the Supreme Court, which would be expected to gain in 
substance and depth. Most importantly, however, some doubts can be expressed 
as to the legitimacy of the Administrative Court itself, in particular concerning 
the availability of an eff ective judicial remedy in administrative matters in 
Cyprus, given that the review of the legality of a controlled act or omission by 
the administration, which is now to be undertaken by the Administrative Court, 
has thereby been severed from the review of the substance of the matter which 
remains under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. 63 
 Following the withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriot community from the 
government, the doctrine of necessity has been the cornerstone of the legal order. 
According to this doctrine, exceptional departures from constitutional provisions 
can take place under specifi c terms and requirements, when compliance with 
such provisions is rendered impossible owing to the withdrawal of the Turkish 
Cypriot community. Despite this rather extraordinary constitutional setting, the 
protection of fundamental rights in Cyprus, which lies at the core of a long legal 
tradition, has remained largely unaff ected. 
 3.2.  LEGAL TRADITION IN CYPRUS: FOCUS ON THE 
PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
 With respect to the methodology of this chapter, the focus on the protection 
of fundamental rights is justifi ed since such protection involves the application 
of not only constitutional provisions  per se but also of relevant international 
and European instruments, as enshrined  inter alia in the national legal order, 
thereby triggering  prima facie the exercise of harmonious interpretation by 
the courts. As previously indicated, the balancing exercise pertaining to the 
 62  Law on the Establishment and Operation of the Administrative Court 2015 (Law 131(I)/2015). 
 63  Th e Administrative Court will however get involved in the substance of the matter in asylum 
and tax cases, so as to release the Supreme Court ’ s workload in these two areas. It is to be 
hoped that the list of areas where the Court will be involved in substance will grow in the near 
future. See Laulh é Shaelou and Kalaitzaki,  “ Cyprus ” (n. 54). 
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protection of constitutional and/or fundamental rights under national law 
must initially be considered with respect to the application of the doctrine of 
necessity. 64 In  Alloupas v. National Bank of Greece , 65 a majority of the Supreme 
Court of Cyprus held that constitutional rights may only be restricted on the 
 express basis of the Constitution and by applying the  “ strictest possible ” criteria 
of necessity (i.e. does a state of necessity exist ? ) and of proportionality (i.e. are 
such restrictions proportionate to the necessity ? ). 66 It is worth noting at this 
stage the constitutional signifi cance of proportionality which, although not a 
general principle deriving directly from the Constitution, 67 has been granted 
constitutional status as an  “ unwritten principle of law ” and referred to by the 
Supreme Court very early on in its jurisprudence as an essential criterion in 
the application of the doctrine of necessity . 68 Th e application of the principle 
of proportionality is therefore dependent on the particular circumstances 
of each specifi c case and constitutes the cornerstone of judicial control. If 
the Supreme Court initially interpreted proportionality broadly, starting 
with the  Ibrahim case, 69 this was where the application of the doctrine of 
necessity did not concern the exercise of legislative powers by the executive, 
or the restriction of fundamental individual rights. 70 Th us, it appears that 
the protection of constitutionally safeguarded fundamental rights in Cyprus 
has remained largely outside of the scope of the doctrine of necessity, leaving 
ample room for the courts to protect them to the highest possible level, and to 
balance the protection of such rights with other considerations whenever this 
was necessary. 71 
 Having clarifi ed the relationship between the doctrine of necessity and 
constitutional and/or fundamental rights and confi rmed that such rights can 
only be restricted on the basis of an express provision of the Constitution, it is 
 64  For this section of the Report, see also Kombos and Laulh é Shaelou (n. 4), sections 1.2 
and 2.2. 
 65  Alloupas v. National Bank of Greece ( 1983 )  1 CLR 55 . 
 66  Emilianides (n. 4), p. 47. 
 67  Th e principle of proportionality is only expressly mentioned in the Constitution in Art. 24 
with respect to individual contributions towards the public burdens. 
 68  In its landmark ruling  Th e A.-G. of the Republic v. Mustafa Ibrahim [ 1964 ]  CLR 195 ; 
see  C.  Kombos ,  Th e Doctrine of Necessity in Constitutional Law ( Sakkoulas ,  2015 ) . 
 69  Emilianides (n. 4), pp. 42 – 44. 
 70  Ibid., p. 42. 
 71  Th e relationship of the doctrine of necessity with fundamental rights in Cyprus however 
occasionally comes to the forefront in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights; 
see  Application No. 49247/08 ,  Kazali and Others v. Cyprus ,  6  March 2012 for the right to 
property of Turkish Cypriots and Application No. 69949/01,  Aziz v. Cyprus , 22 June 2004 
for their right to vote. See e.g. N. Kyriakou,  “ National judges and supranational laws on the 
eff ective application of EC law and the ECHR: the case of Cyprus ” (EUI, 2010) available 
at  < http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1623560 > ; see also more generally 
 S.  Laulh é Shaelou ,  ‘ Market freedoms, EU fundamental rights and public order: views from 
Cyprus ’ ( 2011 )  30 ( 1 )  Yearbook of European Law  298 ,  326 – 33 . 
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then necessary to turn to the Constitution itself in order to assess the balancing 
of these rights, including in the context of EU/European law. It appears that it 
is the accumulation of several key characteristics of the Cypriot Constitution 
which gives the essence of constitutional and/or fundamental rights in Cyprus 
and their protection. First of all, the Constitution contains a detailed and 
extensive list of constitutionally safeguarded fundamental rights, 72 extending 
beyond the substantive provisions of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) to a number of social and economic rights 73 (to be exercised 
 “ within the framework of public interest and common good ” ) 74 and also 
occasionally beyond the scope of the protection aff orded by the Convention. 75 
 Th e reader should also be reminded at this stage of the supremacy of the 
Constitution in the Cypriot legal order, to the eff ect that the ECHR cannot take 
precedence over constitutional provisions. As a result, the ECHR has been said 
to enjoy limited constitutional status in the Cypriot legal order, 76 even if its  prima 
facie  “ weaker ” constitutional status appears to be mitigated by the fact that the 
Convention is  in eff ect part of the Constitution. 77 Th e subordinate constitutional 
status of the ECHR is also mitigated by the willingness of the Supreme Court 
of Cyprus to apply the Convention in its case-law, at least when the protection 
aff orded under the Constitution and the ECHR  “ coincides ” (many provisions 
are identical) or  “ shares common elements ” , 78 perhaps also to the detriment of 
the direct relevance of EU law and of the EU Charter more specifi cally. 79 While 
EU law (all provisions) should take precedence over confl icting constitutional 
provisions as a result of Art. 1A of the Constitution, the use of EU law (and in 
 72  In Part II, under the title  “ Fundamental Rights and Liberties ” (Arts. 6 to 35). See further 
e.g. C. Tornaritis,  Th e State Law of the Republic of Cyprus (Cyprus Research Centre, 1982) 
(in Greek). 
 73  Social and economic rights include  inter alia the right to decent existence and social security 
(Art. 9 of the Constitution), the right to work (Art. 25 of the Constitution), the right to enter 
into a contract (Art. 26 of the Constitution) or the right to strike (Art. 27 of the Constitution). 
 74  C. Tornaritis,  “ Th e Social and Economic Rights under the Law of the Republic of Cyprus ” in 
M é langes Bridel (Lausanne, 1968) 533 – 56, available at  < http://www.kypros.org/Documents/
Tornaritis/docs/social.html > . 
 75  As acknowledged in judgments of the Supreme Court of Cyprus such as  A-G v. Ibrahim [ 1964 ] 
 CLR 195 , 225 ;  A-G v. Afamis  1 RSCC 121, 125 – 26 . Th e right to property as set out in Art. 23 of 
the Constitution would be such an example. It corresponds to Art. 1 Protocol 1 of the ECHR 
but is much more detailed and extensive, as this was confi rmed again recently by the Supreme 
Court of Cyprus in Joined Cases No. 740/2011-587/2012,  Maria Koutselini-Ioannidou 
and Others v. Th e Republic , 7 October 2014, in the context of the austerity measures taken 
in Cyprus to tackle the sovereign debt and fi nancial crisis. See Kombos and Laulh é Shaelou 
(n. 4), section 2.2. 
 76  Emilianides (n. 4), p. 149; see also Kombos and Pantazi Lambrou,  “ Cyprus ” (n. 19), p. 309. 
 77  Kombos and Pantazi Lambrou,  “ Cyprus ” (n. 19), p. 309. 
 78  N.  Kyriakou ,  National Judges and Supranational Laws on the Eff ective Application of EC Law 
and the ECHR: Th e Case of Cyprus ( EUI ,  2010 ),  p. 4 . See also Emilianides (n. 4) 149. 
 79  For an up-to-date legal appraisal of the application of the EU Charter in the national legal 
order, see Laulh é Shaelou and K. Kalaitzaki,  “ Cyprus ” (n. 54). 
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particular the EU Charter) by the Supreme Court, even by way of interpretation, 
is far less developed than the (much older) use of the ECHR. Th is could be 
explained by looking at the overall practice of the supremacy of EU law by the 
courts in Cyprus, as instructed by the Supreme Court in the post- Constantinou 
era. As mentioned previously, despite the reference to Art. 1A in Art. 179 of the 
Constitution, and because the Constitution in Cyprus still provides expressly 
for its own supremacy, considerations of EU law and the exercise of judicial 
control arising as a result of the application of EU law appear  prima facie to 
be encompassed within the fabric of the Constitution. Th is may be the subject 
of some academic debate in Cyprus, but in judicial and/or practical terms the 
overall approach of the Supreme Court can be described as inconsistent and 
as ignoring EU law on most occasions (or even the ECHR), to concentrate 
merely on the protection of fundamental rights in accordance with express 
constitutional or ordinary legal provisions. 80 
 It is also worth noting that the protection of the rule of law has been said to be 
a  “ cardinal principle ” of the Constitution. 81 Th is, combined with the supremacy 
(or rather primacy with the  “ non-dictatorial ” nature) of the Constitution, means 
that any trial court not only has the power to declare unconstitutional a law 
which is contrary to the provisions safeguarding individual human rights as set 
out in the Constitution, but also that constitutionally safeguarded fundamental 
rights must be interpreted in favour of the individual rather than the state in case 
of doubt, 82 arguably as an expression of the duty of harmonious interpretation. 
Finally, it should be noted that the fundamental rights safeguarded under the 
Constitution are minimum rights. Rights may be further protected or new rights 
may be established through legislation, in which case these are not protected 
as constitutional rights but as ordinary rights. 83 Th is last point may have direct 
implications on the protection aff orded to rights deriving from EU law and their 
implementation in the national legal order, depending on the judicial construct 
of the supremacy of EU law in the Cypriot legal order and on the extent of 
compliance with the duty of harmonious interpretation in this context. 84 
 As a general rule, restrictions or limitations to constitutionally 
safeguarded fundamental rights, can only be contained in express provisions 
of the Constitution (Part II), by virtue of Art. 33(1) of the Constitution. Such 
restrictions or limitations may also be contained in legislation within the limits 
of the Constitution itself, 85 as introduced by the House of Representatives, 
 80  See also Kombos and Laulh é Shaelou (n. 4), section 2.2. 
 81  Emilianides (n. 4), p. 53; see also A. Loizou,  Th e Constitution of Cyprus (2011) (in Greek). 
 82  Fina (Cyprus) Ltd v. Republic ( 1962 )  3 RSCC 26 ; see Emilianides (n. 4), p. 146. 
 83  Emilianides (n. 4), p. 146. 
 84  See also Kombos and Laulh é Shaelou (n. 4), section 2.2. 
 85  See more recently  President of the Republic v. House of Representatives ( 2000 )  3 CLR 238 (in 
Greek); see also  President of the Republic v. House of Representatives (No. 2) ( 1992 )  3 CLR 165 
(in Greek). 
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or  “ deemed to be part of Cypriot law under Art. 188 of the Constitution ” , 86 
or deriving from EU law, 87 subject to the general principles of  inter alia 
reasonableness and proportionality, encompassing also  a priori an expression of 
the duty of harmonious interpretation. Art. 33(2) of the Constitution expressly 
provides that such restrictions or limitations must be interpreted strictly and 
cannot be applied  “ for any purpose other than those for which they have been 
prescribed ” . Th is provides a strict framework of necessity and/or proportionality 
to the restriction/limitation to constitutionally safeguarded fundamental rights, 
potentially leaving little room for the expression of the duty of harmonious 
interpretation under EU law, unless enshrined in the necessity/proportionality 
test itself. Th is provision must be read in conjunction with Art.  35 of the 
Constitution, which casts a vertical duty on the state and its various branches 
of government (within the limits of their respective competence) to ensure the 
effi  cient application of Part II of the Constitution  vis- à -vis the benefi ciaries 
of these fundamental rights. 88 In addition to the vertical direct eff ect of 
constitutionally safeguarded fundamental rights, including as protected under 
the ECHR and EU law, the Supreme Court of Cyprus provided in the same case 
for the horizontal eff ect of such rights. 89 In the subsequent case of  Yiallouros 
v. Nicolaou , 90 the Supreme Court clearly provided for the horizontal direct 
eff ect of such provisions, thereby eff ectively extending the exercise of the right 
to compensation by persons whose constitutional fundamental rights have 
been infringed by interference by other private persons. 91 Th e vertical duty 
imposed on the State under Art. 35 of the Constitution, as well as the Supreme 
Court ’ s fi nding in  Yiallouros v. Nicolaou , eff ectively mean that the principle of 
harmonious interpretation should be relevant to all types of legal disputes. 
 In view of all of the above, the protection of constitutionally safeguarded 
fundamental rights in the Cypriot legal order has always been at the core of the 
case-law of the Cypriot courts, independently of the supremacy of EU law and 
of the application of the duty of harmonious interpretation within the meaning 
of EU law. As such, the protection of such rights, as well as their balancing with 
other considerations, can be said to amount to a  “ routine ” exercise for Cypriot 
courts within the fabric of the Constitution, arguably encompassing harmonious 
interpretation in the necessity/proportionality test, to which EU law merely 
added one more  – albeit fundamental  – dimension, thereby increasing in theory 
 86  Police v. Hondrou and Another ( 1962 )  3 RSCC 82 . 
 87  See Emilianides (n. 4), p. 146. 
 88  Police v. Georghiades [ 1983 ]  2 CLR 33 , 66 ; see Emilianides (n. 4), p. 147. 
 89  Ibid. 
 90  [2001] 1 CLR 558 (in Greek). 
 91  Th is ruling was said to be a landmark ruling, progressive even today and participating to the 
building of the European legal order; see Kombos and Pantazi Lambrou,  “ Cyprus ” (n. 18), 
p. 337; see also Emilianides (n. 4), pp. 147 – 48. See also Kombos and Laulh é Shaelou (n. 4), 
sections 2.1 and 2.2. 
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the likelihood of fundamental issues arising. Drawing some general trends from 
this protection and balancing exercise can prove useful, both for the content 
and the methodology of this contribution, 92 as they outline the courts ’ overall 
approach to consistent interpretation. It usually involves a strict (but careful 
and delicate) construction of the restrictions/limitations to such rights on the 
basis of Arts. 33 and 35 of the Constitution, and/or in accordance with the 
case-law of the ECHR (in the case of collision between classic rights). 93 With 
respect to EU law, there could however appear to be potential areas of confl ict, 
for instance given the attachment to social rights of the Cypriot Constitution, 94 
and to free movement and economic rights under EU law. Moreover, in a wider 
framework, the courts have also tried to safeguard rights under directives 
through the eff ective application of the principle of consistent interpretation. 
An example of this would be the (unanimous) Opinion of the Supreme Court 
in relation to the latest law amending the basic law on the protection of beaches 
(Chapter 59 of the laws of Cyprus) and transposing Directive 2006/123/EC on 
services in the internal market into national law. Th e President of the Republic, 
through exercising his right of reference to the Supreme Court under Art. 140 
of the Constitution, 95 returned the bill voted by the House of Representatives 
to the Supreme Court to examine its compatibility with the corresponding 
EU Directive. Th e arguments of the House of Representatives based on the 
general public interest as an exception to the selection process, including under 
Art. 12(3) of the Directive and Art. 25 of the Constitution, were rejected by the 
Court, on the basis that the principles of free competition and of impartiality, as 
set out in EU law and in the Directive more specifi cally, should prevail. 
 It is, however, suggested that the overall protection and balancing exercise 
currently taking place in the Cypriot legal order, whereby the Supreme Court 
 “ advances its own perception ” in the event that the standard of protection 
granted under the ECHR is lower, usually in the absence of any meaningful 
consideration of the case-law of the ECJ, will have to change in the near future, 
so that EU law considerations are also brought to the core of the exercise. 
 92  For a detailed review of the collision between classic rights and/or socio-economic and 
cultural rights, including within these sub-categories of rights, see Kombos and Pantazi 
Lambrou,  “ Cyprus ” (n. 18), pp. 338 – 46. 
 93  Ibid., p. 344. 
 94  In  Apostolides Georghios  & Others v. the Republic of Cyprus through the Ministry of Labour 
and Social Insurance  & Others (1982) 3 CLR 928, the Supreme Court ruled that social rights 
are on an equal footing with political rights but that the economic situation and capacity of 
the country must be taken into account when assessing compliance of a measure with Art. 9 
of the Constitution (right to decent existence and social security); see Kombos and Pantazi 
Lambrou,  “ Cyprus ” (n 18), pp. 314 – 15. 
 95  Art. 140 of the Constitution was one of the provisions of the Constitution amended in 2006 
to refl ect the supremacy of EU law, to the eff ect that the right of reference now expressly 
includes the review by the Supreme Court of the compatibility of national law with EU law, 
in the form of the Services Directive in the present instance. 
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Th is could perhaps result in a lowering (or at least alteration) of the standard 
of protection off ered to certain rights in the Cypriot Constitution, 96 but such 
rights should in any case remain remediable through protection aff orded under 
EU law and the principle of harmonious interpretation. In the meantime, and 
until any confl ict arises, with respect to social rights in particular, what could be 
said is that the test to be satisfi ed for the protection of social rights  “ within the 
framework of public interest and common good ” can appear in eff ect to be even 
higher than for other constitutionally protected fundamental rights, away from 
EU law considerations. 97 
 With respect to the lower courts, the direct infl uence of EU law post-EU 
accession, with respect in particular to the protection of fundamental freedoms 
and the principle of non-discrimination, is not always clearly visible in their 
case-law. Issues of concern relate  inter alia to the right of entry and residence 
for same-sex partners and/or third-country national spouses of EU citizens, the 
free movement of workers, social assistance, detention or expulsion orders of 
EU nationals, 98 including in the context of the recent fi nancial crisis . 99 Issues of 
a more elevated nature, based on the Constitution, are not usually raised in their 
EU context. Even when they are raised, they are not really addressed in such cases, 
as legal actions brought before the courts normally fall within the (narrow) ambit 
of the judicial control of administrative acts under Art. 146 of the Constitution. 
Th ese actions constitute administrative recourses, which until very recently 
fell under the exclusive revisionary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, strictly 
limited to the review of the legality of an administrative act, a decision or an 
omission, and thereby excluding any review of the case on its merits. However, a 
new Constitutional amendment was introduced in July 2015, 100 which changed 
the structure of the Supreme Court by establishing Administrative Courts 
in Cyprus in January 2016, allegedly in order to help the Supreme Court to 
decongest from the workload and award justice faster. Th e said Law amended 
paragraphs 1, 4, 5 and 6 of Art. 146 and added paragraphs 1A, 4(d) and 5A to 
Art. 146 of the Constitution, in order to transfer the fi rst instance jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court under Art. 146, to the newly established Administrative 
Court, to be exercised exclusively by the latter. Th e amending Constitutional 
Law was also a transposing measure for paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 of Art. 46 of 
 96  Kombos and Pantazi Lambrou,  “ Cyprus ” (n. 18), p. 345. 
 97  Th is seems to be confi rmed by the recent case-law of the Supreme Court of Cyprus related 
to austerity measures put in place in response to the sovereign debt crisis; see Kombos and 
Laulh é Shaelou (n. 4), section 2.2. 
 98  See in particular N. Trimikliniotis,  Cyprus National Report 2012 – 2013 (Network on free 
movement of workers, 2013) available at  < http://works.bepress.com/nicos_trimikliniotis/41 > 
for a review of recent domestic case-law related to these issues, pp. 121 – 40. 
 99  See eg  N.  Trimikliniotis ,  “ Migration and freedom of movement of workers :  EU law, crisis and 
the Cypriot States of exception ” ( 2013 )  2  Laws  440 . 
 100  Law of the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution 2015 (130(I)2015). 
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Directive 2013/32/EU, 101 paragraph  1 of Art.  26 of Directive 2013/33/EU, 102 
as well as paragraph 1 of Art. 27 of Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013. 103 
 As a result, the protection and balancing exercise established within the 
fabric of the Constitution for the protection of constitutionally safeguarded 
fundamental rights, as based, for example, on the principle of harmonious 
interpretation, cannot be easily triggered in such administrative nature cases. 104 
Some situations concerning, for example, the right of residence of a third-
country national spouse of a Cypriot citizen, or the rights of Cypriot workers in 
Cyprus, have also been considered by the courts as internal situations, thereby 
giving little role to EU law and to fundamental rights protected as such under 
EU law, as well as potentially raising issues of reverse discrimination. 105 It has 
been suggested that the national courts appear  “ unwilling ” to properly check 
on the immigration authorities, limiting their control to mere administrative 
grounds arising under Art. 146, 106 technical and procedural in nature and 
limited to a review of legality. 107 More generally, although this corresponds to a 
(strict and literal) reading of the Constitution based  inter alia on the principle 
of the separation of powers, it could be said that courts appear to hide behind 
the limitations inherent to the judicial review of administrative acts under the 
Constitution, and rarely adopt a more holistic or teleological approach to the 
rights of Cypriot citizens and other EU citizens and their family members under 
EU law. 108 In a wider framework, it is undeniable that there have been some 
 101  Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection [ 2013 ] 
 OJ L180/60 . 
 102  Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection [ 2013 ] 
 OJ L180/96 . 
 103  Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 
establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for 
examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by 
a third-country national or a stateless person [ 2013 ]  OJ L180/31 . 
 104  Most cases are brought on the basis of Law 7(I)/2007, as amended, which transposes the 
Citizenship Directive 38/2004 and the Aliens and Immigration Law, Chapter 105 of the laws 
of Cyprus, as amended by Law 8(I)/2007, and challenge administrative acts, decisions or 
omissions falling within the ambit of this legal framework. 
 105  See Trimikliniotis,  Cyprus National Report 2012 – 2013 (n. 98); see also  N.  Trimikliniotis , 
 Free Movement of Workers in Cyprus and the EU ( PRIO, Fundamental Rights in Cyprus 
Series  1/2010 )  59 . 
 106  See Trimikliniotis,  Cyprus National Report 2012 – 2013 (n. 98). 
 107  As of July 2015, the Supreme Court is expected to decide asylum cases on merits. 
 108  In limited instances, the Supreme Court has proceeded with the annulment of a detention/
deportation decision, thereby opening the way for an EU citizen to claim compensation 
before the courts under Art. 146(6) of the Constitution; see  Case No. 1726/2010 ,  Robert 
Harvey v. Th e Republic of Cyprus ,  17  January 2012 (in Greek). Compensation however occurs 
within the narrow framework of the judicial review of an administrative act, decision or 
omission under Art. 146, since the annulment of such an act or decision or the ordering of 
the performance of an omission under Art. 146(4) is a pre-requisite to seek compensation 
before the District court under Art. 146(6). 
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gradual adjustments in the protection and balancing of fundamental rights 
including free movement rights, in the framework of EU law and/or in favour 
of economic freedoms as arising mainly from directly applicable instruments of 
EU law and their implementation in Cyprus, thus in a narrow EU law setting 
encompassing some role, albeit not all its potential role, for the principle of 
harmonious interpretation. 
 4.  THE DUTY OF HARMONIOUS INTERPRETATION 
IN CYPRIOT CASE-LAW 
 Th e remaining sections of this contribution will be devoted to the principle 
of harmonious interpretation  per se , through a focus on specifi c case-law. Th e 
methodology to be followed in this second part of the contribution appears to 
unfold quite logically from the fi rst part. Court decisions are the focus, given 
the principle of separation of powers, the strong independence of the judiciary 
and the tight control it exercises on administrative acts. Such court decisions 
are easily accessible via online databases (in Greek) 109 but it is not possible 
to eff ectively isolate all the decisions involving the principle of harmonious 
interpretation. Th e reason for this is that the application of the principle 
forms part of a long established legal tradition in the country, pre-dating EU 
accession, and is very oft en not explicitly referred to in the decisions. Given 
the wide scope of the principle as set out in the sections above, it would appear 
more effi  cient to focus on specifi c cases from the perspective of the relevance, 
analysis and/or the application of the principle of harmonious interpretation 
arising under EU law  – whether express or not; successful or not; or correct 
or not  – not only by the Supreme Court, but also by lower courts, as may be 
applicable. Th e court decisions set out in the following have been selected 
primarily as they have been previously the focus of academic literature and 
arguably give a fair account of the evolution of the principle as applied by 
the courts in Cyprus from EU accession until today, while at the same time 
usefully setting out the backbone of the application of EU law in Cyprus. In 
this respect, the relevance of preliminary references to such case-law is quite 
relative, since opportunities for judicial dialogue arising under Art. 267 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) used to be limited 
and are now gradually developing. 110 As such, preliminary references are not 
 109  < http://www.cylaw.org > . Th ere is no consistent manner to refer to the principle of harmonious 
interpretation in Cypriot case-law, neither to the duty arising under EU law. Th e following 
expressions are usually used in the case-law of the courts:  “ ε ν ι α ί α  ε ρ μ η ν ε ί α ” ,  “ ο μ ο ι ό μ ο ρ φ η 
 ε ρ μ η ν ε ί α ” or  “ κ α θ ή κ ο ν  ε ξ α σ φ ά λ ι σ η ς  τ η ς  ο μ ο ι ό μ ο ρ φ η ς  ε ρ μ η ν ε ί α ς ” . Th ere has been no explicit 
attempt to refi ne the principle in an EU context. 
 110  For an up-to-date and detailed account of preliminary references in Cyprus in the fi rst 
10 years of Cyprus ’ s EU membership, C. Lycourgos,  Preliminary reference to the Court of 
Justice of the European Union  – Law and Practice in Cyprus Ten Years Aft er Accession to the EU 
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always representative of the overall application of EU law in Cyprus, including of 
the principle of harmonious interpretation itself. 111 Due to the non-systematic  – 
yet increasing  – use of the preliminary reference mechanism, 112 it is believed 
that the focused review of the use/compliance with the principle of harmonious 
interpretation by the Cypriot courts in its EU context may actually off er an 
adequate alternative and a more comprehensive overview of the application of 
EU law in Cyprus. 
 Th e courts in Cyprus had long recognised the principle of harmonious 
interpretation of national law in the light of international treaty provisions, at 
least as far as the treaties concerned show an intention of promoting the  “ values 
and the protection of human rights ” . 113 As explained in the sections above, 
EU membership does not seem to have changed this vision much, even if the 
principle came again to the forefront of the national court ’ s jurisprudence upon 
EU accession, explicitly so in the fi eld of immigration, and continues to be an 
important companion of the modern jurisprudence of the courts in Cyprus, 
including in the practice of preliminary references and in the application of the 
principle of proportionality. 
 4.1.  CYPRUS ’ S EU ACCESSION: THE PRINCIPLE 
OF HARMONIOUS INTERPRETATION AS 
A  “ SUBSTITUTE ” FOR PRELIMINARY REFERENCES 
 In  Nebojsa Micovic , Judge Nicolaides ruled on the basis of the case-law of the 
Court of Justice 114 that a directive for which the deadline for implementation 
(March 2014, unpublished study) (on fi le with the authors); see also  C.  Lycourgos ,  ‘ Building 
Intra-Judicial Dialogue: the relationship between the ECJ and Cypriot National Courts ’ 
( 2016 )  41  EL Rev  623 – 37 . 
 111  Only a minority of preliminary references can be said to have involved directly the application 
of the principle of harmonious interpretation so far. On the other hand, there are many 
instances whereby a national court may have used the principle of harmonious interpretation 
to reject a request for a preliminary reference (see below). 
 112  According to the Annual Report of the Court of Justice of the European Union, by the end 
of 2014, Cyprus had submitted  seven references for preliminary ruling. Th e fi rst two were 
submitted in 2009. In 2013 three more references were submitted and another two in 2014; 
see Court of Justice of the European Union Annual Report 2014 (Luxembourg, 2015) 80. 
Out of the seven references for preliminary ruling submitted, four were submitted by the 
Supreme Court of Cyprus and three by other courts or tribunals. Th e number of references for 
preliminary ruling submitted by the Cypriot courts is one of the lowest in the EU (along with 
Malta). Despite the low number of preliminary references to the ECJ, there is nevertheless 
a growing number of cases, either before the Supreme Court or lower courts, where the 
possibility of a preliminary reference is invoked, usually following the request of one of the 
parties, but all too oft en not submitted to the ECJ by the national court, usually acting without 
suffi  cient justifi cation for doing so. See also Kombos and Laulh é Shaelou (n. 4). 
 113  Shipowners Union v. Th e Registrar of Trademarks ( 1988 )  3 CLR 457 . 
 114  Specifi cally see:  Judgment of 10 April 1984, Case 14/83 ,  Von Colson and Kamann v. Land 
Nordrhein-Westfalen ,  ECLI:EU:C:1984:153 ;  Judgment of 13 November 1995, Case C-106/89 , 
 Marleasing v. La Comercial Internacional de Alimentaci ó n ,  ECLI:EU:C:1990:395 . 
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into national law had not yet passed was nevertheless capable of indirect 
eff ect in the national legal order. 115 As a result, the Director of the Migration 
Services in Cyprus was ordered to interpret the relevant provisions of national 
law with respect to the right of permanent residence in Cyprus of a citizen of 
the Former Republic of Yugoslavia  “ in the spirit ” and  “ in accordance with the 
objective ” of Directive 2003/109/EC. 116 In the joined cases of  Vera Joudine , 117 
the Supreme Court reiterated the approach of Judge Nicolaides to the principle 
of indirect eff ect and harmonious interpretation, by recalling the obligation of 
the Member States to take all measures necessary to achieve the result prescribed 
by the Directive during the period for transposition into national law. 118 Yet 
the Court found it  “ irrelevant ” in these two cases, as the applicants did not 
to meet the  “ necessary criteria ” to benefi t indirectly from the provisions of 
Directive 2003/109/EC in national law. Th e applicants did not meet the criteria 
under Art. 4(1) of the Directive concerning legal and continuous residence 
within the territory of the Member State for fi ve years immediately prior to the 
submission of the relevant application. Th e time calculation in this case started 
on 31 August 2005, when the disputed decrees were issued. It is important to 
note that at the time of the rulings, the deadline for the implementation of the 
Directive into national law had passed without the Republic of Cyprus taking 
appropriate measures to ensure its full implementation into Cypriot law. 119 
However, the disputed administrative decisions of the Migration Department 
had been taken before the expiry of the implementation deadline. Th e parties 
were therefore not able to rely on direct eff ect of the Directive, or on a potential 
failure of the Republic of Cyprus to implement the said instrument of (then) 
Community law into national law. 
 In the  Motilla case, 120 yet another decision of the Migration Department 
rejecting the acquisition of the long-term resident status for a third-country 
national was challenged before the Supreme Court of Cyprus, this time 
following the expiry of the implementation deadline of Directive 2003/109/
EC into national law. 121 Th e Interior Minister ’ s decision was based on 
 115  Supreme Court, Administrative Case No. 1012/2005,  Nebojsa Micovic v. the Republic [ 2005 ] 
 4 CLR 890 . 
 116  Of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term 
residents [2004] OJ L16/44. 
 117  Supreme Court, Administrative Case No. 1632-3/2005,  Vera Joudine v. the Republic [ 2006 ] 
 4 CLR 430 . 
 118  Supreme Court, Administrative Appeal No. 55/06,  Vera Joudine v. the Republic [ 2006 ] 
 3 CLR 500 . 
 119  Directive 2003/109/EC as well as Directive 38/2004/EC  inter alia were implemented belatedly 
into Cypriot law in early 2007 in Laws 8(I)/2007 and 7(I)/2007 respectively ( Offi  cial Gazette 
No 4110, 09.02.2007). 
 120  Supreme Court (full bench), Administrative Case No. 673/2006,  Cresencia Cabotaje Motilla v. 
the Republic [ 2008 ]  3 CLR 29 . 
 121  Law No 8(I)/2007 transposes Directive 2003/109/EC and amends the Aliens and Immigration 
Law Cap 105 of the laws of Cyprus as a result. Th is law was enacted in February 2007, whereas 
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Art. 18Z(2) of the Aliens and Immigration Chapter 105 of the laws of Cyprus 
(as amended), on the ground that the applicant ’ s successive residence permits 
were  “ limited as to their duration ” and that the applicant was therefore 
excluded from the scope of the law. Th e applicant applied to the Supreme 
Court to set aside the said decision. Th e Court proceeded to review the case 
in accordance with the Directive and with the Cypriot implementing legislation, 
by fi rst attempting to interpret the disputed provisions under EU law (i.e. the 
Directive), before moving on to interpret the transposing national law in the 
light thereof. Th is method adopted by the Court  – i.e. examining whether an 
interpretation in light of EU law is possible before interpreting national law  – 
is usually more geared towards achieving consistent interpretation in practice, 
than before. 
 Th e central issue concerned the way that Art. 18Z(2)(c) of the implementing 
legislation transposed Art. 3(2)(e) of the Directive and whether this transposition 
aff ected the essence of the Directive. Th e provision of the implementing 
legislation excluded applicants whose residence permits had been limited 
 “ in time ” , whereas the Directive merely excluded  “ formal ” limitation, arguably 
relating to the nature of the status or the sector of employment of the person 
concerned. In a majority decision (9 – 4), the Supreme Court rejected the 
challenge on the grounds that the fi xed-term duration of the applicant ’ s visas 
fell within the exceptions of Art. 18Z(2), and that the addition of the phrase 
 “ as to its duration ” did not detract from the Directive ’ s eff ectiveness. Th e 
Court also ruled that the fi xed-term nature of the residence visas granted to 
the applicant could not create a reasonable expectation  “ that the person has put 
down root in the country ” , as per Recital 6 of the Directive ’ s Preamble. 122 
 In the dissenting judgment in the same case, however, it was argued that the 
phrase at issue fundamentally transformed the essence of the exception provided 
for in Art. 3(2)(e) of the Directive. Th e dissenting judges recalled the ECJ ’ s 
decision in  Ratti , establishing the principle that a Member State cannot rely on 
its own wrongdoing to frustrate the rights of individuals under a directive which 
it has failed to implement. 123 Pursuant to Art. 4(1) of the Directive, Member 
States should grant long-term resident status to third-country nationals when 
they have been residing  “ legally and  continuously ” within their territory for fi ve 
years immediately prior to the submission of the relevant application, with no 
the deadline for the implementation of the Directive ended in January 2006. Th e applicant 
was a female migrant who lived and worked lawfully as a housemaid in Cyprus for six years 
and applied to the Interior Minister as soon as the deadline for transposition expired. 
 122  See  N.  Trimikliniotis ,  Cyprus Report 2007 ( Network on the free movement of workers within 
the EU ,  2009 ),  pp. 31 – 32 ; see also  C.  Demetriou and  N.  Trimikliniotis ,  Cyprus Update of 
the Data Collection Report on Ethnic and Racial Discrimination ( RAXEN National Data 
Collection Report 2007  – Cyprus ,  February 2008 ),  pp. 16 – 22 . 
 123  Case 148/78 ,  Pubblico Ministerio v. Tullio Ratti ,  ECLI:EU:C:1979:110 . 
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further conditions being imposed regarding the issue, nature or duration of 
the residence permit. While recognising the exclusive competence of the ECJ 
to interpret the Directive as an instrument of EU law, the judges interpreted 
the notion of  “ formal limitation ” set out in Art. 3(2)(e) of the Directive as 
having a specifi c meaning common to the immigration policy of all Member 
States, as formulated in particular at a conference of experts held in Brussels 
on 7 – 8 July 2005. Th ey recalled the recommendations of the Summit that 
the implementation of the Directive does not require the issue of a residence 
permit, but the mere legality of the residence; and that any formal limitation on 
residence permits should remain an exception to be interpreted strictly ( ejusdem 
generis ) and in line with the examples provided in Art. 3(2)(e) of the Directive 
(i.e. seasonal workers, volunteers, posted workers, etc.). As a result, the mere 
fact that the residence permit is limited in time but renewable does not make it 
fall under the exceptions set out in the Directive, which are the only ones which 
by their nature can constitute  “ formal limitations ” . Based on the above and on 
the principle of legitimate expectation, the dissenting judges found the draft ing 
of the specifi c provision in the implementing law not only incorrect, but also in 
violation of the substantive meaning of the Directive, hence leading to improper 
implementation. 
 It does not clearly appear from this case to what extent the Court considered 
the direct eff ect of the Directive and/or the liability of the Republic of Cyprus 
arising out of the late/improper transposition of the Directive into national law 
in order to reach its decision. Th e Court appears to have merely applied the 
Directive indirectly, in order to interpret the implementing legislation which  – 
albeit in existence at the time of the ruling  – was enacted subsequently to the 
application made by the plaintiff . She could not therefore rely on provisions 
of national law when enforcing her rights initially, but only on rights deriving 
from Directive 2003/109/EC directly and/or indirectly. Th e fundamental 
disagreement between the majority and the dissenters in the Supreme Court did 
not appear to prompt any discussion as to the possibility of making a reference 
to the ECJ under (then) Art. 234 EC so as to clarify the meaning of the relevant 
provision of the Directive. While the interpretation of a Directive in the national 
legal order is left  at the discretion of the national courts which are subject to 
a duty of harmonious interpretation, 124 the exercise of this discretion by the 
national courts also involves the possibility of making preliminary references 
to the ECJ regarding the interpretation of provision(s) of EU law, including 
directives deemed of relevance to the national proceedings at stake. Th is becomes 
an obligation for a court of last instance, as in the present case. For matters 
falling under (then) Title IV of Part Th ree of the EC Treaty on visa, asylum, 
immigration and other policies related to free movement of persons, however, 
 124  Case C-212/04 ,  Konstantinos Adeneler et al. v. Ellinikos Organismos Galaktos (ELOG) , 
 ECLI:EU:C:2006:443 , para. 116. 
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(former) Art. 68 EC provided that a reference could be brought by the fi nal 
court or tribunal, at its own discretion. Th e Supreme Court did not refer to these 
provisions of the EU Treaties. Th e Court did not fi nd it necessary either to refer 
questions of interpretation to the ECJ, despite the uncertainty surrounding the 
provisions of EU law at stake. 
 Th e decision of the Supreme Court to reject the recourse for administrative 
review in the  Motilla case was eventually explained by the geographical location, 
the small size and the limited population of Cyprus as underlying features of 
its immigration policy. As noted by Trimikliniotis, the vast majority of migrant 
workers are,  “ as a matter of policy ” , issued with fi xed-term visas in Cyprus. 125 
Th is decision had therefore the eff ect of intentionally restricting in law and/or 
in fact the right to long-term residence provided by Directive 2003/109/EC, 
arguably in breach of EU law and of the principle/duty of harmonious 
interpretation, 126 as concluded in the dissenting judgment of the case as well. 
Th is approach was subsequently upheld by the Supreme Court in the  Rawuttar 
case, 127 where Judge Erotokritou referred to the judgment reached by the Full 
Chamber of the Supreme Court in the  Motilla case as a precedent where the 
relevant provisions of EU law had already been examined. 128 
 Th e facts in the  Rawuttar case are similar to the facts in the  Motilla case, 
but for one important point: the applicant ’ s entitlement to lawful residence 
had expired before the end of the deadline provided for the transposition of 
Directive 109/2003/EC into national law. Th e status of the applicant during the 
period running from the expiry of her work permit/right of residence up to 
the expiry of the deadline for implementation of the Directive (at which point 
in time no transposing legislation had been enacted) was therefore at stake 
in this case, given the new legal environment created by the Directive. In this 
respect, the applicant ’ s lawyer requested the judge to exercise his discretion to 
refer to the ECJ as it was a clear case of interpretation of (then) Community 
law. Referring to Art. 8 of the Court ’ s Guidance on References by National 
Courts for Preliminary Rulings, Judge Erotokritou expressly noted that for 
matters falling under Title IV Part III of the (then) EC Treaty, the right to 
 125  N.  Trimikliniotis ,  Cyprus Report 2007 ( Network on the free movement of workers within the 
EU ,  2009 ),  p. 32 . 
 126  Points of interpretation of Art. 3(2)(e) of Directive 2003/109/EC subsequently reached the 
ECJ, who confi rmed that  “ the concept of  ‘ residence permit [which] has been formally limited ’ 
does not include a fi xed-period residence permit, granted to a specifi c group of persons, the 
validity of which may be extended indefi nitely without however off ering any prospect of a 
residence permit of indefi nite duration where such a formal limitation does not prevent the 
long-term residence of the third-country national in the Member State concerned, that being 
a matter for the referring court to ascertain ” , see  Case C-502/10 ,  Staatssecretaris van Justitiev 
v. Mangat Singh ,  ECLI:EU:C:2012:636 , para. 56. 
 127  Supreme Court ,  Shahajan Mohamed Rawuttar v. Th e Republic ,  Administrative Case 
No. 742/06, 24 September 2008 . 
 128  See S. Laulh é Shaelou (n. 8), pp. 480 – 84. 
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refer to the ECJ was limited to fi nal courts of law, at their own discretion. 
He concluded that the court did not satisfy the requirements set out in (old) 
Art. 68 EC in the present case, as it was not acting as a court of last instance. He 
then proceeded with the judicial review of the decision, based on the principle 
of harmonious interpretation of national law in the light of (then) Community 
law. It was held that given the unlawfulness of her residence for a period of 
11  days between the expiry of her residence permit and the expiry of the 
deadline for implementation of the Directive into national law, the applicant 
fell outside the scope of the Directive. 129 Th e judge then added that even if the 
applicant had had a lawful right of residence upon the expiry of the deadline for 
implementation of the Directive into national law, her application would have 
been subject to the precedent created by the Supreme Court in the  Motilla case 
(with no possibility to refer to the ECJ as a fi rst instance administrative court), 
and she would therefore also have fallen outside the scope of the Directive as 
transposed into Cypriot law. 130 Th e decision of the Supreme Court acting at 
fi rst instance, including the issue of non-referral to the ECJ, was subsequently 
appealed before the Supreme Court. 131 On the basis of Art. 267 TFEU, post-
Treaty of Lisbon, it held that the Court acting at fi rst instance was not under an 
obligation to refer questions of interpretation to the ECJ and that the rejection 
of the application was not based on matters related to the interpretation of the 
Directive at stake. 
 Th e above case-law is obviously based on a narrow (even probably erroneous, 
as far as the Supreme Court acting as a fi nal instance jurisdiction is concerned) 
understanding of the practice of preliminary references, complemented by an 
equally strict perception of the duty of harmonious interpretation as limited 
primarily to the interpretation of EU secondary legislation in specifi c instances. 
A few years into EU membership, it is interesting to note the increasingly 
strong correlation developing in the case-law of the courts in Cyprus between 
preliminary references and the principle of harmonious interpretation. 
 4.2.  THE PRINCIPLE OF HARMONIOUS INTERPRETATION 
AS A  “ COMPANION ” TO PRELIMINARY REFERENCES 
AND PROPORTIONALITY 
 As already explained above, a handful of judgments from national courts in 
Cyprus in recent years pertaining to preliminary references can be correlated 
 129  Judge Erotokritou referred to other recourses in administrative control where similar 
decisions were reached by the Supreme Court, as a fi rst instance administrative court, and 
therefore with no possibility to refer to the ECJ in this context. 
 130  See S. Laulh é Shaelou (n. 8), pp. 493 – 94. 
 131  Supreme Court, Administrative Appeal No. 159/2008,  Shahajan Mohamed Rawuttar v. Th e 
Republic [ 2011 ]  3 CLR 508 . 
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directly to (a strict approach of) the principle of harmonious interpretation. 
Either because the relevant court sought guidance from the ECJ on matters 
of interpretation of EU law, or on the contrary ruled against requesting 
such guidance from the Luxembourg Court, again based on the principle of 
harmonious interpretation. 132 Beyond this immediate correlation between 
harmonious interpretation and preliminary references, the principle has recently 
also been used explicitly, and in the context of the sovereign debt and fi nancial 
crisis more implicitly, as a source of inspiration in the name of eff ective judicial 
protection, embodied in the principle of proportionality. 
 In  Alpha Bank Cyprus Ltd , 133 the Supreme Court found that the case was 
dependent on the interpretation of the Regulation (EC) No. 1393/2007 on the 
Service in Member States of Judicial and Extrajudicial documents in Civil and 
Commercial matters, and therefore referred three questions to the ECJ. Th is 
ruling was preceded by a fi rst ruling in the case, where the Supreme Court had 
held that all issues pertaining to the service of the documents at stake could be 
remedied under national law. 134 Th is meant that the only legal issue pending in 
the case pertained to the interpretation of the EU law instrument, which was 
seen by the Court as having implications on the  “ implementation of EU law in 
all the territory of the Union ” and which was subsequently referred to the ECJ. 
Th is case represented an early attempt to interpret national law in the light of EU 
law by preference of relying on the preliminary reference mechanism, in order to 
preserve the principle of consistent interpretation. 
 In the case of  Th omas Kaoulla and Eleni Kaoulla, 135 a preliminary reference 
was requested in relation to the interpretation of the EU Charter. Th e applicants 
requested  inter alia to submit a question regarding the equality in tax schemes 
of refugee and non-refugee citizens of the Republic of Cyprus. Th is request for a 
preliminary reference was part of the grounds for appeal, challenging the decision 
of the fi rst instance court. Th e Supreme Court indicated that the appellant could 
not invoke issues before the appeal court that had not been invoked or disputed 
before the lower court. Th erefore, since no issues of violations of rights stemming 
from EU Law (including the Charter) were raised in the fi rst instance decision, 
they could not be raised for the fi rst time at the appeal stage. Th e Supreme Court 
concluded that for the reasons stated, a possible preliminary reference would 
just be an  “ academic exercise ” and that this is not the purpose of a preliminary 
 132  Th ere are more such examples, both from the Supreme Court and lower courts. 
 133  Supreme Court, Joined Civil Appeals E23/2013-29/2013, [2013] 1 CLR 1935; Case C-519/13 , 
 Alpha Bank Cyprus ,  ECLI:EU:C:2015:603 . 
 134  Supreme Court ,  Cypra Ltd v. Th e Republic ,  Administrative Appeal 78/2009 ,  5 June 2013 . 
See Lycourgos,  Preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union (n. 110), 
p. 28. 
 135  Supreme Court ,  Th omas Kaoulla and Eleni Kaoulla v. Th e Republic, through the Attorney 
General ,  Civil Appeal No. 77/2012 ,  13 February 2013 . 
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reference. Proceeding to interpret the provisions of the Charter itself, the Court 
added further that: 
 in any case, the notions of Art. 20 and 21 of the Charter are largely identical with the 
corresponding notions of the Constitution [of Cyprus], which have been fully clarifi ed 
by the Cypriot case-law and therefore there would be no reason for a preliminary 
reference, even if the issue could be raised on appeal. 136 
 Unlike the above examples which arguably entail a narrow understanding of 
the scope of the duty of harmonious interpretation on the national courts, the 
principle and the duty deriving there from appear to have inspired directly or 
indirectly certain other (more EU acquainted) judges, both at the lower courts 
and the Supreme Court. Judge Pantazi Lambrou in the  Constantinos Oikonomou 
case 137 referred to the duty of harmonious interpretation imposed on national 
courts with respect to the interpretation of national law, irrespective of whether 
the issue at stake is a cross-border dispute falling within the scope of EU law 
and whether direct eff ect can be triggered or not. Th e case concerned a dispute 
between two individuals, where the claimant was requesting damages for breach 
of a motor vehicle purchase contract. Specifi cally, Judge Pantazi stated that when 
applying provisions of national transposing laws  – in this case-law 7(I)/2000  – 
the Court is bound to interpret it when possible, in the light of the wording and 
purpose of the applicable Directive (1999/44/EC on certain aspects of the sale 
of consumer goods and associated guarantees), in order to achieve an outcome 
consistent with the objective pursued. If the national law was not interpreted 
in the light of the Directive ’ s wording, it would possibly aff ect the rights of the 
claimant in obtaining the benefi t of the disputed guarantee, since the status of 
the defendants as  “ sellers ” was contested. Th e Court cited relevant case-law of 
the ECJ to illustrate the argument and follow it in practice. 138 
 Judge Erotokritou, in his landmark dissenting judgment in  Myrto 
Christodoulou dealing with the bail-in measures taken by the Cypriot authorities 
and aff ecting thousands of depositors in Cyprus during the fi nancial crisis, 
 136  Ibid, (translated by the authors). 
 137  District Court of Nicosia, Civil Case No. 1449/2009, 29 June 2015. 
 138  Case C-497/13 ,  Froukje Faber v. Autobedrijf Hazet Ochten BV ,  ECLI:EU:C:2015:357 , para. 33: 
It must be pointed out at the outset that the dispute in the main proceedings is between 
two individuals. It is true that in such an action neither of the parties may rely on the direct 
eff ect of Directive 1999/44. However, it is also settled case-law that a national court, when 
hearing a case exclusively between individuals, is required when applying the provisions of 
domestic law to consider the whole body of rules of national law, and to interpret them, so 
far as possible, in the light of the wording and purpose of the applicable directive in order 
to achieve an outcome consistent with the objective pursued by that directive (see,  inter alia , 
judgment in  Case C - 565/12 ,  Cr é dit Lyonnais ,  ECLI:EU:C:2014:190 , para. 54 and the case-law 
cited). 
Intersentia 523
Cyprus
developed a test of proportionality and reasonableness, encompassing EU law 
instruments with special reference to the EU Charter and to the free movement 
of capital. 139 He added that such a  “ compatibility test ” could be undertaken by 
a national court directly applying EU law, including general principles, and 
referring questions of interpretation or of validity to the ECJ in the event of 
uncertainty. He recalled that judicial dialogue is available to all national courts, 
including the lower civil courts, provided that the measures at stake do not 
escape the scope of review by being classifi ed as  “ acts of government ” , which is 
for the Supreme Court under its exclusive administrative revisional jurisdiction 
to determine. In the latter cases, the full essence of the test is thereby eff ectively 
restricted to application by the Supreme Court. Judge Erotokritou warned 
against political decisions being taken overnight under extreme pressure 
(including at the EU level), allegedly in the interest of the state, escaping the 
test and undermining the rule of law and the principle of legality common to 
both the national and the supranational legal orders. He then concluded that 
the compatibility test includes a review of the balance between the public 
interest and the restrictions on individual rights within the framework of the 
Constitution and of the EU Treaties, which can only be undertaken by the 
Supreme Court within its exclusive administrative revisional jurisdiction, and 
which must be maintained at all times, including during crisis time. Despite 
being a dissenting judgment, this arguably constitutes a powerful plea to all 
national courts to not only interpret national law in the light of EU law by fully 
embracing the core principles and values of EU law, but also to make use of the 
judicial dialogue route in every possible instance, including in times of crisis. 
With respect to the specifi c legal dispute, it should be noted that numerous civil 
actions are still pending before the District Courts in Cyprus, while the door to 
the Supreme Court through an administrative recourse remains closed aft er the 
 Myrto Christoudolou case. 140 
 In conclusion, in general terms the EU principle of consistent interpretation 
seems to have impacted the Cypriot method of statutory interpretation towards 
an internalisation of EU law in Cyprus. However, as explained above, the overall 
approach of the Cypriot Supreme Court can be described as inconsistent and as 
sometimes ignoring EU law (and even the ECHR), 141 when it comes to applying 
provisions of fundamental rights focusing on the protection of fundamental 
rights within the framework of the Cypriot Constitution. Moreover, it would 
appear that the Cypriot courts had initially been more willing in the past to 
achieve harmonious interpretations where confl icts arose between Cypriot and 
 139  Myrto Christodoulou et al [ 2013 ]  3 CLR 427 (dissenting judgment). 
 140  See also  S.  Laulh é Shaelou and  P.  Athanassiou ,  “ Cyprus Report ” , in  G.  B à ndi  et al. (eds.), 
 European Banking Union ( Congress Proceedings , vol.  1 ,  Wolters Kluwer ,  2016 ),  pp. 294 – 96 . 
 141  Interview with Dr. Demetrios Hadjihambis, former President of the Supreme Court of 
Cyprus (June 2013 – July 2014) and judge at the Supreme Court (1999 – 2013), 9 January 2015. 
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ECHR law, than between Cypriot and EU law. A notorious example is the case of 
 Constantinou , discussed above, where the Court had relied on the  contra legem 
limitation to avoid achieving conformity with EU law in practice. In particular, 
the judges would use the principle of consistent interpretation to apply EU law 
only where no confl ict arose with the national law. However, the Courts have 
moved a long way since the  Constantinou case, especially aft er the amendment 
of Art. 1A of the Constitution, which grants legal and judicial supremacy to 
EU law. Th e Courts are now even trying to apply and interpret EU law when 
there is no such formal requirement. 142 
 142  See e.g.  District Court, Case No. 4602/14 ,  Institute of Archbishop Makarios III and others 
v. CBC, Bank of Cyprus Plc, Resolution Authority, Attorney General of the Republic, Antri 
Antoniades (in her capacity as special administrator of Laiki) and Cyprus Popular Bank Public 
Co. Ltd ,  26  August 2014 , where Judge Annie Pantazi Lambrou made multiple references 
to the EU Directive on Bank Resolution and Recovery as soon as it was published in the 
Offi  cial Journal of the EU and well before its implementation into national law, relying on the 
principle of indirect eff ect as developed in the case-law of the ECJ, paras. 14 – 15. 
